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Multiple disasters management: Lessons from the Fukushima 
triple events 
 
Abstract 
It has been five and a half years since the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) in March 
2011. This study summarize management and policy lessons from the GEJE. The recovery 
efforts that followed the triple disasters: the earthquake, tsunami and meltdown of the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant are in progress. The experience of the GEJE and tsunami 
prompted the building of embankments throughout the Pacific coastal side of the Tohoku 
region. The Cabinet’s Reconstruction Headquarters used at least 19 trillion yen ($158 billion) 
for intensive reconstruction over five years through 2015. The local government of the affected 
area accelerated the decontamination of commercial land which is an important action for the 
recovery. The central government introduced the Electricity Business Act for implementing 
voluntary energy conservation measures for peak energy seasons. The GEJE has had an indirect 
effect on the health of the disaster victims via job uncertainty as well. Decontamination is 
crucial in bringing people and businesses back to the affected area and promoting sustainable 
economic recovery because it reduces uncertainty about the short and long-term health risks. 
An efficient health and occupation plan for the victims is essential for the integrated approach 
to multiple disaster management. 
 
1. Introduction 
The aftermath of the meltdown of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant has severely 
complicated the process of recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE). The 
affected area has suffered from both economic damage and increased health risks due to 
residual radiation. Decontamination of the affected areas is still underway, but progress in the 
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recovery is evident. Discussion about nuclear radiation now focuses on pressing local 
governments to conduct regular environmental radiation monitoring and to update radioactive 
deposition data. This study summarize management and policy lessons from the GEJE. 
Although the debate continues about preparedness before the event and disclosure of its 
severity, it appears that Japanese authorities have taken actions to mitigate the impact of 
radiation on human health. These actions include evacuating more than 200,000 inhabitants 
from the vicinity of the site, monitoring food and water, and systematically scanning evacuees. 
However, the situation at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear facility remains fluid, and the long-
term environmental and health impacts will likely take years to be fully known (Dauer et al., 
2011). 
The recovery process has two main pillars that are closely entwined. One is 
decontamination and the associated reductions in health hazards, and the other is the aggregate 
economic recovery. Economic recovery is possible only if evacuees return to the affected area 
(see Sanaei et al., 2016), which requires the health risk from radioactive contamination to be 
reduced. Economic damage from the radioactive contamination is well documented (Tanaka 
and Managi, 2016; Yamane et al., 2011a, b). An increase of 1𝜇Sv/h decreases the land price by 
3.39% on average in Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures, and the estimated economic damage 
due to the radiation-related aftermath of the GEJE to Fukushima is approximately 64.1 billion 
Japanese yen (U.S. $0.53 billion) (Tanaka and Managi, 2016). However, research shows that 
the land price decline is only partially explained by increased levels of radiation. Population 
decreases also have indirectly affected land prices. Thus, population increase, which would 
result primarily through the return of victims to the area, is crucial for economic recovery (see 
Shin et al., 2016). 
According to the Reconstruction Agency of Japan’s annual survey of the victims who have 
been evacuated from severely contaminated areas, the decision to return to Fukushima depends 
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foremost on the recovery of infrastructure and public services that directly affect the recovery 
of their businesses. Another important concern for the evacuees is the speed in which the 
decontamination process takes place (Reconstruction Agency, 2014).  
Decontamination is crucial in bringing people and businesses back to the affected area and 
promoting sustainable economic recovery because it reduces uncertainty about the short and 
long-term health risks. To date, more than 1,500 billion yen ($12.5 billion) has been invested 
in the decontamination process. The Act of Special Measures Concerning the Handling of 
Pollution by Radioactive Materials has provided the legal basis to spend large amounts of 
money for decontamination, but the process is still incomplete (Yasutaka et al., 2013). The 
problem is that the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant has been continuously releasing 
radioactive substances. Therefore, the very source of radioactive contamination has yet to be 
stemmed.  
Allocating resources to decontamination is difficult given the high cost and the limited 
budget for recovery from the multiple disasters. In the future, it may be useful to prioritize 
decontamination by ranking the capacity of the land to generate economic value. One possible 
solution for the recovery of the affected area would be to accelerate decontamination of 
commercial land and delay decontamination of farmland. Given budget limitations, 
commercial land has a relatively higher monetary value, and therefore. the optimal length of 
the decontamination process for commercial land is 5-10 years as compared to more than 30 
years for farmland (Munro, 2013). 
2. Lessons in managing and recovering from the triple disasters  
2.1 Dealing with energy shortages 
The GEJE and the subsequent accidents in the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant catalyzed 
the revival of the energy security problem in Japan. Moreover, the accident destroyed the image 
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of nuclear power as a safe and efficient energy source. As a result, the government shut down 
all 54 nuclear plants, causing the share of nuclear power in electricity generation to drop from 
30% to zero for almost two years until the recent restart of the Sendai Nuclear power plant in 
Kagoshima on August 11th, 2015. This decline in electricity generated by nuclear plants boosted 
the share of imported fossil fuels for electricity generation.  
Such policy changes increased the import cost of fossil fuels for electricity generation by 
approximately 3.6 trillion yen ($30 billion) per year as compared to before the earthquake 
(Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), 2010). Given that a large share of the 
additional fossil fuels come from the Middle East and North Africa, where many countries 
suffer from political instability, the government has restricted electricity consumption during 
peak demand seasons. The government restricted electricity use in 2011 through the Electricity 
Business Act, setting specific target numbers for 2011 and 2012, and then implemented 
voluntary energy conservation measures for peak energy seasons from 2012 to 2015. 
Consumption behavior in Japan changed to deal with energy shortages in the short and 
long term. Restrictions on electricity usage reduced consumption by 8% (Okajima et al., 2015). 
In the industrial sector, restrictions reduced electricity consumption in both the short and long 
term. Electricity consumption decreased more in summer than in winter. In the residential 
sector, restrictions reduced electricity consumption only in the short term and only in summer. 
The aftermath of the accidents has induced heated debate domestically and internationally 
as to whether nuclear power is required to secure energy in the short and long term. The 
government has developed a nationwide argument that takes into account the factors of safety, 
efficiency, economy, and environment, but the arguments are based on the future reduction of 
nuclear power dependency (The Energy and Environment Council (EEC), 2011). The 
government proposed three options for the energy mix by 2030: a nuclear-power-free society, 
15% dependence, and 20% to 25% dependence on nuclear energy (The Energy and 
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Environment Council (EEC), 2012). Because the dependence in 2010 was 26% and the pre-
GEJE target for dependence in 2030 was 45%, all the proposed options have ambitious changes 
in the level of dependence. As a result of the nationwide discussion, the government in 2012 
announced a national strategy that seeks for the country to forego dependence on nuclear energy. 
The announcement reflects the voice of citizens informed about the impact of all the options 
on the energy mix, energy costs and the economy. According to The Executive Committee of 
the Deliberative Poll on Energy and Environmental Policy Options (2012), the majority of 
citizens support zero nuclear energy in the future.  
The results of a hypothetical survey indicate that residential consumers are willing to pay 
approximately 6% more of the electricity fee for renewable energy, which is less than the 
increased cost required for a non-nuclear power choice (Morita and Managi, 2015). In this 
sense, an electricity price increase plays a key role in residential demand, in contrast to the 
suggestion of the Executive Committee. Consequently, the current government moved to 
restart the operation of nuclear plants, arguing that nuclear power is an important energy source 
and that energy policy needs to promote coexistence with nuclear energy. Nuclear energy can 
increase energy security by reducing dependence on other countries. Without nuclear energy, 
Japan was 96% dependent on foreign fuels during 1985 to 2011. Despite the risk, nuclear 
energy is a clean energy source that can mitigate climate change and has other environmental 
and social benefits. To recover public confidence in its nuclear energy management, the 
government is reforming nuclear regulation; the first step was the opening of the Nuclear 
Regulation Authority on June 15, 2012.  
2.2 Building embankments 
Damages from a tsunami are expected and considered unavoidable, especially in a large-
scale tsunami (Taniakwa et al., 2014). The GEJE brought serious damage in terms of human 
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lives and infrastructure. The tsunami swept over the coast of northeastern Japan, claiming more 
than 20,000 lives and destroying hundreds of thousands of buildings, along with 60 % of 
seawalls. The GEJE caused direct economic damage of 300 billion yen ($2.5 billion) by 
destroying dikes.  
Obviously, an adequate protection system can reduce the damages. Infrastructure such as 
embankments can withstand the tsunami (Tokida and Tanimoto, 2014). After the GEJE, some 
towns in the region were well protected by the structures in place, even though the tsunami 
exceeded their design height. In Iwate’s Fudai Village, the 15.5-meter floodgate, built in 1984, 
protected the village and its 3,000 inhabitants (Ishiwatari and Sagara, 2012). The floodgate was 
constructed because of the mayor’s decision to protect the village from a future tsunami. The 
project cost 3.6 billion yen ($36 million), which was funded by the central and prefecture 
governments and not by the village. The decision was criticized at the time, but the high cost 
was justified once mega-disaster struck (Iwata et al., 2014).  
Most other cases did not work the same way. The GEJE demonstrated the limitations of 
Japan’s disaster management systems, which relied heavily on dikes (Ishiwatari and Sagara, 
2012). From the standpoint of disaster management, mitigating the impact of future tsunamis 
by building embankments is essential. The government has already invested several hundred 
billion yen in dike construction around disaster areas (Ishiwatari and Sagara, 2012; Imamura 
et al., 2016). Badly damaged prefectures such as Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate have been 
constructing dikes and increasing the height, width, and in some cases the length of seawalls 
since the disaster.  
The experience of the GEJE and tsunami prompted the building of embankments 
throughout the Pacific coastal side of the Tohoku region, and it is expected that embankments 
will protect Japan’s entire coast in the future. It is not clear how much it would cost to build 
embankments in other regions.  
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2.3 Economic recovery 
The GEJE in 2011 had a negative impact on Japan’s economy (see Figure 1), especially in 
Fukushima. The Tohoku region is showing a positive growth trend because of government 
investment in the recovery effort, and the offsetting positive effect appeared in Fukushima in 
2012. In the past three years, overall Japanese consumption decreased 2-3%, but it declined by 
more than 18% in the disaster-affected Tohoku region. Damage to building stock is calculated 
to be 11 to 20 trillion JPY1 (Saito, 2015).  
The Cabinet’s Reconstruction Headquarters used at least 19 trillion yen ($158 billion) for 
intensive reconstruction over five years through 2015. To recover from the damage caused by 
the GEJE, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan created a special reconstruction 
zone for the affected Tohoku region’s prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaragi) on 
December 7th, 2011. By this act, the central government paid as much as 75% of the initial 
costs for the reconstruction of factories and firms in Fukushima. Each prefecture set up its own 
subsidy system to attract businesses to the prefecture, expecting the effects to spill over and 
assist in the recovery of industries.  
Before the GEJE, the value of shipments of manufactured goods from Fukushima 
prefecture was 51 billion yen ($425 million) (Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), 
2010). The recovery plan includes reconstructing factories for the manufacturing industry, 
rebuilding the infrastructures for the agricultural and fishery industries, and constructing a new 
floating wind-power generating station. So far, the investment in construction has increased. 
Although the cost effectiveness of the investment is not yet known, a significant amount of the 
budget has been allocated for reconstruction (Iwata et al., 2014).  
                                                 
1 Japanese Yen 
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3. Persistent challenges in managing multiple disasters 
3.1 Lack of multidisciplinary sciences 
The current need in disaster science is to prepare, adapt and recover from multiple and 
sequential disasters, a challenge that requires a multi-disciplinary research effort. The 
Fukushima crisis in March 2011 is an example of multiple disasters because the earthquake, 
tsunami and radiation leak took place within a short period. This event illustrates the 
importance of predicting and evaluating large disasters and proves the need for disaster 
mitigation and adaptation policies (see Islam et al., 2016, Rajapaksa et al., 2016 for perception 
change after the event).  
The multiple disasters produced shocking and unavoidable damage in Japan. The challenges 
faced by the Japanese government to handle these risks show the extreme importance of 
managing multiple disasters. Although combined disasters are more dangerous, current disaster 
management strategies tend to consider the risks of individual disasters, mainly because of the 
difficulty in understanding uncertainty in the quantitative modeling (see Onuma et al., 2017 for 
how individuals react to risk and information). 
Nuclear reactor accidents are very rare events, and few medical practitioners have direct 
experience treating patients who have been exposed to radiation or responding to such a public 
health crisis (Christodouleas et al., 2011). A primary health concern after a nuclear accident is 
the risk of thyroid cancer. Fukushima evacuees received a much smaller dose of radiation than 
Chernobyl evacuees did (Tokonami et al., 2012), but health concerns remain because patients 
contaminated with nuclear radiation also need psychological care, as will be discussed later. 
Multidisciplinary research is essential to understand the different dimensions of impact and to 
ensure proper treatment. 
The health risk of Fukushima nuclear radiation was evident in Japan as well as in Asia 
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(Bolsunovsky and Dementyev, 2011), Europe (Masson et al., 2011) and USA (Leon et al., 
2011). Large-scale catastrophic events have global consequences, and global effort is essential 
to mitigate the severity of the crisis. Therefore, a close network of multidisciplinary researchers 
is needed for efficient decision making in case multiple disasters such as the Fukushima 
accident in 2011 happen again. 
In Europe, Realizing the European Network of Bio-dosimetry (RENEB) has been created to 
strengthen emergency preparedness and response in the case of a large-scale nuclear accident 
or radiological emergency. RENEB includes 23 experienced laboratories from 16 European 
countries with the aim of providing quick, efficient and reliable support (Kulka et al., 2012). 
In Asia and on other continents, the multidisciplinary research team needs to identify multiple 
disaster risks from different dimensions. 
3.2 Disaster management by domestic institutions  
Government handling of large-scale disasters differs by country and by locality within a 
country. We discuss the difference between the U.S. and Japanese disaster management 
systems and the actual and probable impacts on the management of the GEJE.  
Japan has a unique federal disaster management system in which the disaster experts from 
different ministries gather in a special agency headed by the Prime Minister to deal with the 
aftermath of a disaster and set the direction of the recovery process. Under the Disaster 
Countermeasure Basic Act, the Headquarters for the Extreme Disaster Management was 
formed after other large-scale natural disasters. The system has been improved throughout its 
history, such as after the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, when the efficiency of decision 
making was improved by increasing the authority of headquarters and by requiring more timely 
responses from the bureaucracies and political administration.  
According to reports prepared by the Cabinet Office Government of Japan (CO) (2012), the 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency is composed of bureaucrats with different expertise 
from different ministries who work together to provide prompt, efficient initial support to the 
damaged area by working with the affected local administrations. However, the U.S. system is 
different than that of Japan in that the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency plays a 
central role at the time of all disasters. Unlike Japan, which has a separate headquarters for a 
nuclear emergency, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency deals with all disasters, 
including nuclear-related disasters, technological disasters and other national security-related 
disasters. The U.S. disaster management system is a rather independent and top-down system, 
whereas the Japanese system requires coordination between the ministries and the 
administration in office.  
One of the strengths of the Japanese coordination system at the time of a disaster is that 
trained experts in different areas can share expertise and information collected from different 
perspectives. Headquarters members include not only representatives from different ministries 
but also experts from the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 
Japan Coast Guard, and the Self-Defense Forces. Moreover, because the head of the 
government leads the team, decisions made by the members of headquarters can be 
implemented quickly. A timely response that considers the tradeoff between security, finances 
and environment can quicken the recovery process.  
In the case of multiple disasters such as with the GEJE, damage from the earthquake and 
tsunami was dealt with by the Headquarters for the Extreme Disaster Management, whereas 
the nuclear-related disaster was dealt with by the separate headquarters of the nuclear 
emergency response. This special headquarters to deal with nuclear emergencies was 
established under the Act on Special Measures for Nuclear Disasters, which was passed shortly 
after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant accident. Despite this quick establishment, there 
was poor information sharing across the government, the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
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(TEPCO), which owns the nuclear plant, and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
(Matanle, 2011; Nakamura and Kikuchi, 2011). 
We emphasize the difficulties with institutional coordination and with communication 
between central and local governments during large-scale multiple disasters. After the GEJE, 
local governments in the affected area quickly set up their own disaster management 
headquarters, which are established automatically by the prefecture law of the Local Disaster 
Management Plan. The problem, typically, is disagreement between central and local 
headquarters regarding the allocation of financial and human resources. However, due to the 
scale of the GEJE, out of 352 municipalities in four affected prefectures, 62 % of municipal 
facilities were damaged and 12 % of administrative facilities were completely destroyed 
(Cabinet Office Government of Japan (CO), 2012). Hence, in the case of GEJE, rather than 
disagreeing or miscommunicating with the central governments, the local government lost its 
capacity to collect information or act as a disaster manager in its locality. The system beyond 
the bilateral coordination is indispensable (Norio et al., 2011), and therefore, we need to 
consider a framework in which it can function during multiple disasters without depending 
solely on coordination between a few agents at risk of being immobile.  
3.3 Global effort in managing 
Sharing scientific knowledge about radiation dispersion requires a solid mechanism to build 
mutual trust among interested parties. Although assistance from other countries is commonly 
suggested for nuclear radiation, in practice, there are concerns about the leakage of confidential 
information. Fukushima offers a unique opportunity because Japan is providing access that 
enables researchers to gain a profound understanding of a nuclear accident, whereas in 
Chernobyl, researchers were unable to obtain information due to Soviet security.  
Nuclear debris is likely to melt with water and transfer through the ocean to nearby shores. 
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Water samples collected in Russia and Greece show the high-velocity movement of radioactive 
contamination from the Fukushima nuclear accident and the global effects of this accident, 
similar to those caused by the Chernobyl accident (Bolsunovsky and Dementyev, 2011). 
Radioactive fallout from the Fukushima reactor explosion was detected in environmental 
samples collected in France (Evrard et al., 2012), the Iberian Peninsula (Lozano et al., 2011), 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Nakano and Povinec, 2012), Korea (Kim et al., 2014), Vietnam 
(Long et al., 2012) and other places around the world.  
The effects of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on energy security were apparent not only in 
Japan. The accident resulted in a loss of public support for nuclear energy and led Germany 
and Italy to shut down some of their nuclear reactors and abandon plans to build new ones 
(Hayashi and Hughes, 2013). The severity and proximity of Fukushima exposed the Chinese 
public to the potential risks associated with nuclear power (Huang et al., 2013). Globally, public 
acceptance of nuclear power decreased significantly after the accident and the popularity of 
alternative renewable energy sources increased (see Nakada et al., 2016 for discussion on 
alternative policies on electricity). 
Air, water and soil in Austria were monitored for artificial radionuclides released during the 
accident, but the Fukushima accident did not contribute significantly to the total radio-cesium 
inventory in Austria (Steinhauser et al., 2013). The Fukushima Dai-ichi release of radionuclides 
into ocean waters caused significant local and global concern about the spread of radioactive 
material. Various radionuclides were transported across the Pacific toward Europe, but airborne 
activity levels pose no concern for public health in Europe (Masson et al., 2011). 
The Fukushima accident has increased awareness of nuclear energy risks around the world. 
Global cooperation and effort is unavoidable under these circumstances (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2015), and ever-increasing energy demand is managed by alternative safe 
renewable energy. Although Japan has maintained its nuclear reactors safely with regular 
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inspections, it is struggling to handle the current nuclear crisis. Therefore, developing countries 
that are embarking on nuclear power may be unable to handle nuclear power plants safely, and 
an unavoidable occurrence may contribute to a nuclear crisis worldwide. 
3.4 Health issues and psychological care 
The GEJE damaged not only property but also humans in the disaster area, and some of the 
health damage may be caused by anxiety, such as about evacuation and unemployment. There 
are mental health problems among disaster victims as well as issues of compassion fatigue 
among caregivers and discrimination against Fukushima residents (Yamashita and Shigemura, 
2013). Although there is no consensus as to whether and how natural disasters affect suicide 
rates, suicides have risen in the immediate aftermath of the more harmful natural disasters and 
even several years later in the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake (Matsubayashi et 
al., 2013). 
Evacuees decreased from approximately 470,000 in the aftermath of GEJE to half that 
number in July 2014. Approximately 10,000 evacuees continue to live in provisional housing 
(Reconstruction Agency, 2014). The stress of life in temporary housing may be one of the 
factors harming mental health. Depopulation with rapid aging is occurring, for example, in the 
city of Minamisoma because of the Fukushima accident (Ishikawa et al., 2012). The aging of 
society increases the risk of health problems. 
Poverty is considered to be another key factor in the health damage (Matsubayashi et al., 
2013). More than 100,000 jobs were lost in three quake-stricken prefectures in 2011(Ministry 
of Health Labour and Welfare (MHLW), 2011), and there were more than 1,400 bankruptcies 
in the three years after the GEJE (Tokyo Shoko Research Ltd (TSR), 2014). Supply-chain 
disruptions (Stewart, 2011) and harmful rumors (Haworth, 2013; Koyama, 2012) also damaged 
the economy. For example, 77.2% of 1,208 consumers refrained from purchasing Japanese 
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food after the accident because of fears about the food supply (Kim et al., 2015). 
Anxiety about employment can make people expect to live an erratic life in the long term, 
and it is possible that unemployment results in an impairment of mental health (Paul and Moser, 
2009). Unemployment is significantly associated with male suicide rates, especially among the 
demographic of prime age working men (Kuroki, 2010). This implies that the GEJE has had 
an indirect effect on the health of the disaster victims via job uncertainty as well as a direct 
influence on the victims through the event itself. 
There is another way in which a health condition impacts the labor force for the long term. 
A significant negative impact of radiation on the labor market was observed in the case of the 
Chernobyl disaster (Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2011). The impact of radiocesium on human 
health in the case of Fukushima is expected to be smaller (Evangeliou et al., 2014), but there 
are various anxiety factors that affect human health (Karz et al., 2014). Although it is still too 
early to assess the impact of radiation on the local market in areas affected by the GEJE, policy 
makers need to provide effective labor and general economic recovery policies as well as 
accelerate the decontamination process to avoid the negative effects of radiation.  
4. Conclusion 
Since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, approximately 440 nuclear power reactors in 30 
countries have operated without any catastrophic accident until the accident at the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi nuclear plant. Before the GEJE and the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, developing 
countries including China, Russia and India have shown growing interest in expanding nuclear 
energy. China was expected to show the largest growth in nuclear reactor installation. Other 
developing countries, including Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Taiwan and other Persian Gulf 
countries had shown interest in installing nuclear reactors. However, the accident in Fukushima 
has forced those governments to reassess the risk of nuclear plants and many large-scale 
projects were cancelled. 
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The nuclear disaster in Fukushima not only changed the expectations and plans of 
developing countries regarding expanding nuclear energy, it also initiated a debate on energy 
policy in the developed countries that already have nuclear plants. The reaction of influential 
economies varied; U.K., policy makers resolved to proceed with expansion of nuclear power 
generation, whereas Germany decided to shut down old-generation of nuclear reactors, at least 
temporarily, and to re-examine the safety of all national nuclear power facilities (Mitchell et 
al., 2012; Wittneben, 2012). The U.S. government temporarily stopped construction of new 
nuclear plants but resumed construction in March 2013. 
From the different responses of external observers of the accident, Germany’s attempt to 
shift to alternative energy had an impact on current Japanese energy policy (Glaser, 2011). It 
has been a serious challenge for the Japanese electricity sector to overcome the shortfall in 
electricity production without nuclear energy. The government has responded to the crisis with 
a new feed-in tariff to promote renewable energy and has proposed reducing dependence on 
nuclear power (Huenteler et al., 2012). Despite these efforts, imported fossil fuels are still 
substituting for most of the energy that used to be produced from nuclear energy.  
The shift away from a zero-nuclear policy is important for both economic and environmental 
reasons. On April 11th 2014, the current cabinet of Japan headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
of the Liberal Democratic Party adopted a new basic energy policy that officially abandoned 
the zero-nuclear policy adopted by the previous administration headed by the current 
opposition party. The government recently restarted one nuclear plant after it passed the new 
standard test, and the government and electricity company that owns the plant tried to persuade 
citizens to support the operation of nuclear plants. Concerns about health risks and the progress 
of decontamination remain the major obstacles to support for restarting nuclear plants. Prime 
Minister Abe emphasized energy security as a reason to restart operations in his speech in 2013 
and has guaranteed that the radiation risk would not affect the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo. 
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However, the decontamination process in Fukushima is expected to take another decade, and 
the current effort to promote nuclear energy has seen little success among citizens. Moreover, 
the chief of the Nuclear Regulation Authority has remarked that passing the new and stricter 
requirement does not imply the plants are safe. 
More generally, nuclear power has been always controversial because of the tradeoff 
between possible detrimental accidents and carbon (The Energy and Environment Council 
(EEC)) efficiency. In addition, initial construction costs are sufficiently high that it becomes 
difficult to make an economic argument for nuclear power, even before incorporating the 
external costs (Davis, 2011). Figure 2 shows the discounted per unit electricity generation cost 
of different energy sources. In the long term, nuclear power generation is cost effective, but in 
the short term, the cost is relatively high because of the initial construction cost.  
The decommissioning of nuclear power plants is another big concern. For Japan, 
decommissioning would cost about $10 billion. Globally, the cost is estimated to be more than 
$100 billion, even when excluding the costs of permanent waste disposal (International Energy 
Agency, 2014). Therefore, when building a plant, countries must consider not only the accident 
risk but also the long-term decommissioning cost.  
Finally, there is an important accountability question in the case of disaster. Transparency is 
the key issue when disasters and accidents hit the community. Nuclear energy policy in Japan 
was supported by the Myth of Security, which represents the strong belief that nuclear plants 
are 100 % safe from accidents (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015). However, the 
accident happened and the central government initially told TEPCO to announce that there was 
not large-scale core melting and melting through (i.e., penetration of nuclear fuel to the pressure 
and containment vessels) until the news media disclosed the nuclear meltdown (Ryall, 12 May, 
2011) and melt-through (Ryall, 9 June, 2011). The administration and related bureaucracies as 
well as electric companies may have suffered from moral hazard in terms of safety regulation 
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and preparation for disaster under the blind belief that nuclear plants, especially Japanese plants, 
are completely safe.  
Lack of transparency is not the only problem. The other big challenge is solving the 
disorganization caused by the division of responsibility among various actors, including the 
central and local governments, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the electric power 
companies and the nuclear plant crew. Currently, the distribution of responsibility depends 
upon the scale and type of the accident. For example, a local government might be responsible 
for evacuation plans for accidents up to a severe level, whereas the central government takes 
the initiative only in extreme cases. The order of the nuclear plants receiving examinations for 
restarting is heavily influenced by politics and the METI’s interest in restarting nuclear 
generation.  
To build an efficient disaster management plan that can be a model for the international 
community, we need to be transparent and accountable at the time of disasters and accidents. 
Moreover, the post-disaster management ability of the government could be evaluated by 
negotiating with local communities and citizens, including some of the victims of the disasters, 
about (resuming) operation of nuclear plants in the near future. Finally, understanding lessons 
learned and implementing required policies are essential for Sustainable Development Goals. 
Technology is one key aspect for better future but management in policy making is essential 
(Dasgupta et al., 2015; Managi et al., 2016).  
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Figure 1: Change in gross domestic product (%) 
 
 
 
Note: Tohoku region includes Miyagi, Iwate, and Ibaraki prefectures.  
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015, National Accounts of Japan: Quarterly Estimates of GDP; Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts.  
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Figure 2: Electricity generation cost of different energy sources in Japan after the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011 
 
 
 
Note: Upper limit of nuclear power is unknown
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